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 Jonathan G.S. Koppell
 Yale University
 Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment
 of Interests: The Case of Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac
 This article explores the political influence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Using
 Congress's overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case
 study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish govern-
 ment-sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest
 groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs. A
 triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome.
 The case has implications for students of organizational theory as well as policy makers consider-
 ing the use of GSEs or other hybrid organizations.
 Although their names suggest Southern folksiness,
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are recognized in Washing-
 ton for their political clout, not their down-home cooking.
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, known formally as the Fed-
 eral National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home
 Loan Mortgage Corporation, respectively, are government-
 sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-stockholder-owned, profit-
 seeking corporations created by Congress to help address
 America's housing needs. GSEs are one type of hybrid
 organization that combines characteristics of public- and
 private-sector entities.
 Although they are increasingly popular at the local, state,
 and national levels of government, hybrids receive rela-
 tively little attention. This article considers the political
 influence of GSEs through an examination of congressional
 crafting of legislation in 1992 to reshape the regulatory
 oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Specifically,
 this article has two objectives:
 * Provide better understanding of GSEs. "While called
 'private,"' observes Harold Seidman, who coined the
 term government-sponsored enterprise, "these enter-
 prises really function in a terra incognita, somewhere
 between the public and private sectors" (1988, 23). While
 some have suggested frameworks for considering the
 gamut of hybrid organizations (see Perry and Rainey
 1988), this article takes the opposite tack: It is field re-
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 connaissance, an effort to understand the dynamics sur-
 rounding a particular type of hybrid.
 * Specify the interaction of organizational structure and
 political influence. David Truman observes that "Al-
 though the effect of structural arrangements is not al-
 ways what its designers intended, these formalities are
 rarely neutral" (1993, 322). It should not be surprising
 that the characteristics distinguishing government-spon-
 sored enterprises from private corporations and govern-
 ment agencies should distinguish the nature of their po-
 litical influence as well.
 Federal regulators recently unveiled proposed regula-
 tions intended to ensure the financial safety and sound-
 ness of the two GSEs and to set levels of performance for
 low-income borrowers. Thus it is a timely moment to re-
 visit legislation calling for the regulatory overhaul. The
 legislative history presented in this article was constructed
 from official records, trade magazines and newspapers, and
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 extensive background interviews with participants from all
 sides including multiple executive agencies, Fannie Mae,
 Freddie Mac, interest groups, congressional staff, and other
 interested parties. I
 What Are Government-Sponsored
 Enterprises?
 Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are hy-
 brids-part public, part private-that affect the lives of
 most Americans. Anyone who has borrowed money to
 purchase a home, farm, or pay for college, or invested in
 a mutual fund has likely been touched by government-
 sponsored enterprises.2 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
 public in several respects. Created by Congress to serve
 public purposes, they are exempt from state and local
 taxes, exempt from registration requirements of the Se-
 curities and Exchange Commission, and have a $2.25
 billion line of credit with the United States Treasury.3 They
 are not, however, subject to regulations that govern the
 activities of federal agencies. Their staffs are not consid-
 ered government employees.
 On the private side, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
 profitable businesses owned by private shareholders. Their
 combined net income in 1998 was over $5 billion (OFHEO
 1997). In terms of assets, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac rank
 third and sixth, respectively, among American corporations
 (Fortune 1999). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock, traded
 on the New York Stock Exchange, consistently outperforms
 the S&P 500 average. Their executives earn multimillion-
 dollar salaries comparable to their Fortune 500 peers.
 Although there is no direct cost to the federal govern-
 ment, GSEs do present financial risk. Despite explicit dis-
 claimers to the contrary, investors believe that the federal
 government stands behind the GSEs' outstanding obliga-
 tions. Because this perception has not been discouraged,
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities have the implicit
 backing of the U.S. government.
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: A Primer
 When Congress created the Federal Housing Adminis-
 tration (FHA) in 1934 to insure lenders against borrower
 default, it was expected that private associations would
 purchase the mortgages as investments. No such associa-
 tions ever materialized, so in 1938 an office was created
 within the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to fill the
 role (Fish 1979).4 This office, eventually named the Fed-
 eral National Mortgage Association (later dubbed "Fannie
 Mae"), purchased FHA-insured loans from private lend-
 ers. Fannie Mae also purchased federally guaranteed loans
 to World War II veterans.5 The great suburban expansion
 of the 1950s was fueled by such loans (Jackson 1985).
 Thus, the federal government not only assumed the de-
 fault risk on these loans, it created a secondary mortgage
 market, a place for lenders to sell loans, thereby increas-
 ing the supply of money for more loans. Fannie Mae was
 gradually sold to private owners, and in 1968 it was char-
 tered as a shareholder-owned corporation (R. Moe 1983),
 moving its expenditures "off budget." At the same time,
 the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
 Mae) was created as a government corporation to handle
 unprofitable subsidization programs.
 In 1970, Congress created the Federal Home Loan
 Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) to purchase loans
 made by institutions that were part of the Federal Home
 Loan Bank System (another Depression-era entity cre-
 ated to channel credit to home buyers). When the savings
 and loan (S&L) crisis precipitated the restructuring of
 the savings industry in 1989, Congress transformed
 Freddie Mac from a government corporation into a GSE
 modeled on Fannie Mae.
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considerably further
 removed from the federal government than other federal
 housing entities. The Federal Home Loan Bank System is
 overseen by a board comprising five presidential appoin-
 tees. The president of Ginnie Mae and the commissioner
 of the FHA are appointed by the president and answer to
 the secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
 Development (HUD). The president and officers of both
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in contrast, are selected by
 the boards of directors. Their management answers to the
 board, not to the United States government. Although the
 president of the United States appoints five of 18 board
 members, these directors are not distinguished from the
 other members by an obligation to represent the president
 or the administration (Musolf 1983).
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not lend money or in-
 sure individual mortgages, but they do act as conduits. They
 purchase loans originated by private institutions (banks,
 thrifts, and mortgage bankers), giving lenders money to
 make additional loans or investments. Fannie Mae or
 Freddie Mac keep the monthly payments made by the bor-
 rower, or they bundle many loans together and resell shares
 of the monthly payments as "mortgage-backed securities."6
 Securities sold by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are free of
 credit risk; that is, even if home buyers default on their
 loans, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac will pay the holders of
 the mortgage securities all the money to which they are
 entitled (See figure 1).
 The most significant business advantage that Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac enjoy (by virtue of their GSE status) is
 relatively low borrowing costs. Because of the implicit fed-
 eral guarantee, the companies borrow at interest rates only
 slightly higher than those paid by the U.S. Treasury. Even
 companies rated as "AAA" by corporate rating firms pay
 Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests 469
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 higher interest rates on debt securities than Fannie Mae or
 Freddie Mac (R. Moe 1983). The prices of their mortgage
 securities also reflect the safety of the investment. As a
 result, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy an effective
 duopoly over the secondary market for home loans.7
 The tremendous volume of loans handled by Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac results in significant financial obligations,
 at present approximately $2.4 trillion (OFHEO 1997), a
 liability that largely went unnoticed before the savings and
 loan crisis in the 1980s. The S&L debacle served as a pain-
 ful reminder that off-budget liability could become quite
 tangible. Congress included a provision in the 1989 bail-
 out law calling for a study of the government's GSE liabil-
 ity.8 The subsequent budget reconciliation act called for
 additional reports and mandated congressional action on
 GSE regulatory reform, setting the stage for the struggle
 that is the focus of this article.9 Prior to the passage of the
 Federal Housing Enterprise Safety and Soundness Act of
 1992, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been overseen by
 a few HUD employees, none of whom were dedicated to
 the task full time. ' The act, signed by President George
 Bush, created a new quasi-independent regulatory agency
 and strengthened HUD's statutory authority.
 Hybrid Characteristics and GSE Influence
 On matters pertaining to housing and housing finance,
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are influential participants
 in the legislative process. Freddie Mac and particularly
 Fannie Mae have been identified as influential political
 players in Washington (Bradsher 1992; Labaton 1991;
 Matlack 1990; Nitschke 1998). This surprises those who
 presume the two GSEs are "part of the government," not
 organized interests. In fact, that confusion helps to explain
 the two companies' political power. Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac are powerful because they possess resources
 that are generally associated with both private and public
 sector institutions. '
 No pejorative connotation should be inferred from this
 description of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Although
 contemporary discourse frequently paints "political influ-
 ence" in negative terms, it is not intended here to convey
 nefarious intentions or deeds. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
 have been successful in pursuing their legislative agendas;
 this article simply offers an explanation.
 The Private Fannie Mae and Freddie
 Mac: GSEs as Interest Groups
 The political activities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
 are restricted in the same ways as any private company.
 Both companies lobby Congress, build relationships with
 individual politicians, and cultivate a network of other
 interest groups. This is a brief summary of the private-
 470 Public Administration Review * July/August 2001, Vol. 61, No. 4
 sector characteristics that give Fannie Mae and Freddie
 Mac their influence.
 Money. Like many large profitable corporations,
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac devote resources to politi-
 cal activities. Political expenditures can take many forms:
 personnel devoted to legislative or political liaison, de-
 velopment of educational materials, and advertising. Fed-
 eral Election Commission records reveal that executives
 of both companies contributed heavily to the political
 campaigns of relevant committee members (including the
 years during which the Federal Housing Enterprise Safety
 and Soundness Act of 1992 was under consideration), and
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac appear on congressional
 honoraria reports for speaking engagements. Fannie Mae,
 for a time, ran a political action committee (Fannie PAC),
 which was disbanded after its existence generated criti-
 cism. Both companies frequently advertise in popular
 media and publications aimed at congressional members
 and staff.
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy financial resources,
 not by chance, but as a function of their structure. They
 enjoy legally protected partial franchises and are profit-
 able, at least in part, due to the implicit support of the fed-
 eral government. Because every aspect of their operations
 can be affected by congressional action, Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac have powerful incentives to devote signifi-
 cant attention to Congress and to politics in general. Thus,
 one can conclude that GSEs will possess resources and
 motives to expend them for political advantage.
 Electoral Connection. As purchasers of mortgages in
 every congressional district in the United States, Fannie
 Mae and Freddie Mac are of potential interest to every
 member of Congress. Their centrality in the American sys-
 tem of home finance makes issues related to Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac salient for representatives interested in
 the financial well-being of their constituents, an effective
 hook on which to hang lobbying efforts.
 Understanding this, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac em-
 ploy strategies to reinforce their connection to member's
 districts. Fannie Mae, for instance, produces computer-
 generated maps that graphically display how much busi-
 ness the company is doing in each congressional district.
 The two companies also steer corporate attention to mem-
 bers. At announcements of new affordable-housing initia-
 tives and other lending programs, elected officials are given
 the opportunity to bask in the positive attention generated
 by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
 Loyal Allies. Lenders, realtors, and other housing-re-
 lated trade organizations that depend on Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac for their business can be mobilized to bolster
 the GSEs' political strength. Again, the structural domi-
 nance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ensures the avail-
 ability of this resource. The GSEs' status secures their hold
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 on a large share of the residential mortgage market. Thus,
 relationships with partners are asymmetric, and Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac have historically relied on consistent sup-
 port from organizations with national memberships.
 Critics have accused Fannie Mae of being heavy handed
 in its efforts to maintain solidarity. In 1986, Salomon Broth-
 ers opposed Fannie Mae's bid to amend its charter and
 expand its business. Not only did Salomon fail to stop
 Fannie Mae, it was cut off from the lucrative underwriting
 business that Fannie Mae had steered toward the Wall Street
 firm (Matlack 1990; Taub and Gold 1989). Fannie Mae
 withdrew advertising from The Economist after several
 articles-and editorial cartoons-portrayed Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac unfavorably (Matlack 1990). Fannie Mae
 has also been accused of using donations from its chari-
 table foundations to coerce political support from depen-
 dent nonprofit organizations (Zuckman 199 la).
 The 1999 formation of "FM Watch," an interest group
 created by mortgage-industry businesses and trade asso-
 ciations, suggests that the landscape may be changing. FM
 Watch is a response to the feared expansion of Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac business into new areas of the mortgage
 market (Schroeder 1999).
 Network Dominance. Former, current, and potential
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac employees constitute an ex-
 tensive network in the housing finance community. The
 two GSEs offer the opportunity to work on housing-re-
 lated issues with private-sector compensation and unpar-
 alleled levels of substantive engagement. As one former
 congressional aide (now working for a GSE) put it, "If
 you're interested in housing and finance in the United
 States, there is no better place to be working than at Fannie
 Mae or Freddie Mac."
 As a result, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac personnel ros-
 ters boast numerous alumni of the executive and legisla-
 tive branches, with both the Democratic and Republican
 parties well-represented. For example, current CEO
 Franklin Raines recently returned to Fannie Mae after a
 stint as head of the Office of Management and Budget;
 Newt Gingrich recently signed on as a consultant to Freddie
 Mac. The two companies thus gain expertise and connec-
 tions to key players in the legislative process and the
 administration's policy formulation. Furthermore, there is
 an impressive history of GSE executives crossing back into
 government service, giving the company advantages in
 terms of access, and sympathy, at the highest levels.
 The Public Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: GSEs
 as Powerful Bureaucracies
 The politics-administration dichotomy that is attributed
 to Woodrow Wilson exists as an ideal; such separation is
 feasible, even in Wilson's account, only with agreement
 on the ends of government (Wilson 1887). Barring such
 consensus, bureaucracies (and the individuals who popu-
 late them) are part of the political process. Although nu-
 merous models have been offered to capture the place of
 bureaucracy in that process, all agree that public bureau-
 cracies possess resources that can be utilized for political
 influence (Hill 1991). The public aspects of government-
 sponsored enterprises endow them with many of the re-
 sources attributed to public bureaucracies. This influence
 complements the private-side resources.
 Unassailability. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are in a
 unique position to claim their successful performance as a
 matter of national importance. Chartered by Congress, the
 two GSEs represent a governmental effort to help Ameri-
 cans purchase their own homes. Housing is, in the words
 of one Fannie Mae executive, a "white hat issue." Fannie
 Mae and Freddie Mac can strategically "wrap themselves
 in the flag" and make attacks politically costly.
 Expertise. Experience, information, and technical ex-
 pertise sometimes give bureaucracies the upper hand in
 negotiations (Rourke 1984). In the case of Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac, nonprofit organizations and congressional
 committees do not have the resources to conduct research
 and develop arguments with the breadth and depth of the
 GSEs. Even HUD can be outmatched.
 This advantage was particularly evident during consid-
 eration of legislation pertaining to the capital stress tests,
 computer simulations that would determine capital require-
 ments for each GSE. Individuals with sufficient technical
 proficiency to challenge the GSEs' claims were sprinkled
 throughout the administration and congressional staff.
 These individuals were, by their own accounts, outgunned.
 As a result, the GSEs dominated the crafting of legislation
 regarding these tests.
 Insiders. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are historically
 and structurally linked to the federal government. Many
 home loans insured by the federal government are pur-
 chased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Both companies
 have worked with HUD on program evaluation and inno-
 vation. Like many housing organizations, HUD relies on
 the GSEs in such partnerships because they offer expertise
 and financial resources. Finally, the GSEs' long-term re-
 peated interaction with members of Congress and their
staffs has given them the opportunity to build strong rela-
 ionships. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac emphasize differ-
 ent strategies. One senior GSE officer noted that Freddie
 Mac has focused on maintaining strong relationships with
 the executive branch, while Fannie Mae has traditionally
 maintained strong ties on Capitol Hill.
 The Best of Both Worlds: More Powerful than
 Agency or Private Company
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac possess more resources as
 hybrids than they would as fully private or fully public enti-
 Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests 471
This content downloaded from 
            130.68.233.107 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 17:45:42 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ties. This point can be illustrated by considering two ficti-
 tious mortgage-purchasing entities. Consider the cases of
 the Federal Mortgage Agency, part of the executive branch,
 and Acme Mortgage Corporation, a private company.
 The Federal Mortgage Agency would be subject to po-
 litical control, run by a political appointee, and answer-
 able to the president. It could not take retributive actions
 against businesses or interest groups that failed to endorse
 its legislative agenda. As a result, the Federal Mortgage
 Agency's behavior would be limited. It could not take po-
 sitions independent of the administration. Without the lati-
 tude to punish clients and partners who do not act as allies
 in the political realm, it could not coerce surrogates. The
 Federal Mortgage Agency could not independently lobby
 Congress. It could not serve particular areas selectively
 and strategically. Moreover, the agency would be subject
 to a host of federal management laws and regulations gov-
 erning everything from personnel to procurement.
 Now consider another fictitious entity, the privately
 owned Acme Mortgage Corporation. Acme could spend
 large sums of money to cultivate political good will with
 impunity. It could enlist support from dependent institu-
 tions on key policy issues. However, as a private corpora-
 tion, Acme would be restricted by federal financial laws. It
 would not have the implicit backing of the federal govern-
 ment or exemption from federal regulations and state or
 local taxes. Finally, Acme would not enjoy the imprimatur
 of public purpose and the mandate of the federal charter.
 In short, neither the Federal Mortgage Agency nor Acme
 Mortgage Corporation would likely wield the same eco-
 nomic and political influence that Fannie Mae and Freddie
 Mac display. As government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie
 Mae and Freddie Mac have all the advantages of our ficti-
 tious entities and none of the disadvantages. It is not sur-
 prising that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac resist calls for
 privatization, which could mean severing the remaining
 ties to the federal government. As one congressional staff
 member who has worked closely with the GSEs concluded,
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are "more powerful than if
 they were private or if they were public."
 The Alignment of Interests around GSEs
 Terry Moe (1989) argues that interest groups can shape
 bureaucracies for their own advantage. Although this case
 study is consistent with Moe's hypothesis, this article is
 primarily concerned with an additional claim that is, in a
 sense, the converse of Moe's. The structure of institu-
 tions can shape the preferences of interest groups. In this
 case, the arrangement of interests around Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac reflect the organizational features of GSEs.
 Furthermore, this alignment of interests was pivotal in
 determining the outcome of the legislative process. The
 472 Public Administration Review * July/August 2001, Vol. 61, No. 4
 following sections describe the alignment of interests
 around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and illustrate the
 significance of this arrangement with examples from the
 drafting of the Federal Housing Enterprise Safety and
 Soundness Act of 1992.
 The Alignment of Interests Around Fannie
 Mae and Freddie Mac
 Government-sponsored enterprises are governed by
 three objectives that could conflict with one another:
 1. To fulfill programmatic policy purposes. In the case of
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, this means providing
 greater access to mortgage credit markets.
 2. To maintain a financially safe and sound operation that
 minimizes risk to the federal government.
 3. To operate as a profitable private company that main-
 tains a consistent return to shareholders.
 Reckless pursuit of profits could undermine achieve-
 ment of public purposes and expose the federal govern-
 ment to financial risk. Overly risk-averse regulation of fi-
 nancial safety and soundness could hinder the GSEs'
 abilities to meet programmatic goals or limit profitability.
 Overly ambitious programmatic goals could adversely af-
 fect the GSEs' profitability or even their financial safety
 and soundness.
 This suggests a triangular arrangement of interests
 around the GSEs, each point potentially at odds with the
 other two (See figure 2). A brief description of the interest
 groups at each point of this triangle introduces the source
 of conflict between interests in the case of Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac.
 Programmatic Considerations. Fannie Mae and Freddie
 Mac are regarded as part of the federal response to the
 public's housing needs. Although they were created to sta-
 bilize mortgage markets, eliminate regional disparities in
 credit availability, and facilitate home buying among
 middle- and working-class Americans, Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac should now, in the view of housing advo-
 cates, focus on providing credit opportunities for
 underserved markets and borrowers. Thus, proponents of
 housing for low- and moderate-income communities, gen-
 erally nonprofit organizations, are pressing Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac to devote additional resources to housing for
 less-affluent Americans. The Department of Housing and
 Urban Development shares this interest in the GSEs' pro-
 grammatic function.
 Profitability. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are both
 profit-seeking companies, an orientation that is codified in
 the GSEs' charters. Even the clause pronouncing Fannie
 Mae's obligation to provide assistance to low- and moder-
 ate-income borrowers specifies that the company is entitled
 to a "reasonable economic return" on a// programs (12 U.S.
 Code 1716).
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 Of course, the most interested parties in the profitabil-
 ity of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are their owners and
 managers. Stockholders' desire for the companies to main-
 tain their market status creates a powerful incentive for
 executives. Like many corporate managers, executives at
 both companies are judged and compensated based, in large
 part, on stock performance. Thus, the corporate leadership
 is likely to resist legislation that would make it more diffi-
 cult to maintain stock value.
 The normative question of whether government-spon-
 sored enterprises should be profit oriented is not relevant
 to this article. The fact that GSEs are profit-seeking enti-
 ties is integral to explaining their behavior. The ownership
 of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, an "interest group" con-
 cerned with the profitability of their companies, brings a
 distinct set of interests before Congress.
 The profitability of other companies may also be at
 stake when Congress considers government-sponsored
 enterprises. Primary market lenders (banks, thrifts, mort-
 gage bankers) depend on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
 Without the stream of capital the GSEs guarantee, many
 lenders could not function. Home builders, realtors, mort-
 gage insurers, contractors, landscapers, and other hous-
 ing-related industries recognize the critical role of Fannie
 Mae and Freddie Mac; more loans means more business.
 Similarly, Wall Street firms that handle the multimillion-
 dollar issuances of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securi-
 ties have a strong interest in the two companies. The more
 business the GSEs are doing, the more income such firms
 earn by underwriting the sale of debt and mortgage secu-
 rities to investors.
 Of course, there can be serious disagreements among
 these groups. For example, some financial institutions that
 depend on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac complain they
 cannot compete with the GSEs because of their preferen-
 tial status. One should not assume that all mortgage-re-
 lated businesses would naturally endorse proposals ben-
 eficial to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
 Financial Safety and Soundness. The combined out-
 standing debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exceeds $740
 billion (OFHEO 1997). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guar-
 antees cover more than $1.1 trillion in outstanding mort-
 gage securities (OFHEO 1997). To give some perspective,
 the housing GSEs' $2.4 trillion combined liability is greater
 than the actual or projected total outlays of the U.S. fed-
 eral government in any single year.
 Although such large numbers may seem abstract, the
 risk is quite real. The financial conditions of Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac, for example, are very sensitive to inter-
 est rate movements. Unforeseen shifts in the market can
 have catastrophic consequences. Fannie Mae absorbed
 "substantial losses" in the early 1980s when interest rates
 rose and the companies' borrowing costs greatly exceed
 its revenues (BNA Banking Report 1990). Freddie Mac has
 written off millions of dollars in losses on poorly managed
 programs (Economist 1989). If, for example, even one GSE
 were unable to meet its current outstanding obligations,
 the federal government would be stuck with a bill for hun-
 dreds of billions of dollars.
 Interest groups concerned with the financial safety and
 soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not readily
 visible. If Fannie Mae can produce a higher rate of return
 for its stockholders by maintaining a small cushion of re-
 serve capital, the stockholders benefit. The increased risk
 is borne by the federal government, and the stockholder
 can bail out if the company's fortunes deteriorate. Wall
 Street investment banks are equally unconcerned with fi-
 nancial safety and soundness: As long as investors are con-
 fident that the federal government guarantees Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac securities, their business is not affected.
 At stake, then, is the creditworthiness of the federal
 government. Unfortunately, the public good of "creditwor-
 thiness" is diffuse and indivisible, difficult to organize an
 interest group around. This is a logical extension of the
 observations that Stanley Surrey offers on the politics of
 tax breaks; the cost of tax loopholes is so diffuse as to be
 nonexistent (Surrey 1976). The costs to taxpayers presented
 by GSEs is even more diffuse. In fact, there is only a risk
 of cost. By analogy, then, legislative resistance to GSE risk
 should be lower than it is for tax breaks.
 The strongest institutional advocate for fiscal prudence
 is the Treasury Department, which took the lead in drafting
 the safety and soundness legislation. A handful of "public
 interest" groups and members of Congress raised the risk
 presented by government-sponsored enterprises. It is tell-
 ing, however, that perhaps the single most effective advo-
 cate for safety and soundness regulation has been a private
 individual, Washington attorney Thomas Stanton, a former
 Fannie Mae associate general counsel and self-appointed
 activist for financial safety and soundness. Stanton's 1991
 book, State of Risk, and his personal lobbying were influen-
 tial in the legislative process (Matlack 1990; Rauch 1991).
 Alignment in Action: Redesigning a
 Regulatory Framework
 The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and
 Soundness Act of 1992 took shape over three years. Fannie
 Mae and Freddie Mac worked with the administration to
 develop the initial proposal and later negotiated with con-
 gressional staff. This gave the GSEs, as a former Office of
 Management and Budget official described it, "two bites
 at the apple." The alignment of interests, combined with
 the resources available to the GSEs, allowed Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac to shift the debate from disadvantageous
 issues to more favorable ground. Yet the history of the leg-
 islation shows that opponents recognized this strategy and,
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 to some extent, counteracted it successfully. This section
 considers three key elements of the act: regulatory struc-
 ture, capital standards, and affordable-housing goals.
 Regulatory Structure. The act divided regulatory au-
 thority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac between a new,
 quasi-independent agency, the Office of Federal Housing
 Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), and HUD. OFHEO is re-
 sponsible for safety and soundness regulation, while HUD
 is responsible for programmatic regulation. This outcome
 resulted from a combination of congressional politics, fear
 of regulatory capture, and the GSEs' desire to maintain
 Congress's role in the oversight process.
 The fear of regulatory capture came from all points of
 the interest group triangle. Safety and soundness advocates
 worried that a small, independent regulatory agency could
 be influenced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and that
 HUD would subordinate safety and soundness to program-
 matic goals. Affordable-housing advocates were wary of
 Treasury regulation because safety and soundness might
 dominate programmatic considerations. The GSEs were
 leery of any regulator that might hinder their ability to func-
 tion successfully.
 The May 1991 General Accounting Office report to
 Congress recommended the creation of a federal enterprise
 regulatory board to oversee all government-sponsored en-
 terprises. Such a regulator would have "the visibility and
 capability to act promptly and effectively if a government-
 sponsored enterprise experiences severe difficulties" (GAO
 1991, 46). The "super-regulator" idea, however, was
 doomed from the outset. The proposed super-regulator
 would have overseen agricultural, educational, and hous-
 ing GSEs. Thus, the agriculture and education committees
 would likely have lost jurisdiction over their GSEs to the
 banking committee. Such changes are not generally wel-
 comed enthusiastically (see Fenno 1973). Furthermore,
 existing regulators resisted efforts to strip away their au-
 thority and, in some cases, their reason for existence.
 The critical issue was whether HUD should retain regu-
 latory authority or whether a new regulatory agency should
 be created to oversee Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The
 GSEs took different positions regarding the optimal regu-
 latory structure. Fannie Mae argued that HUD should con-
 tinue in its role as regulator. A politically insulated inde-
 pendent regulator might diminish the value of relationships
 with HUD and Congress that Fannie Mae had long culti-
 vated. Freddie Mac, on the other hand, favored the inde-
 pendent-regulator proposal. One independent regulator
 with safety and soundness as well as programmatic au-
 thority over the two housing GSEs, Freddie Mac argued,
 would produce more coherent regulation.'2
 The Treasury Department favored the creation of a
 single, independent regulator, while HUD was loathe to
 surrender its regulatory authority. The Bush
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 administration's desire to maintain a united front forced a
 compromise: separation of safety and soundness from pro-
 grammatic regulation within HUD. The Treasury was sat-
 isfied that the OFHEO director was sufficiently insulated
 from the HUD secretary. According to the statute, "The
 Director is authorized, without the review or approval of
 the Secretary, to make such determinations, take such ac-
 tions, and perform such functions as the Director deter-
 mines necessary" to set capital standards, issue and en-
 force regulations, and examine Fannie Mae and Freddie
 Mac (12 U.S. Code 4513).
 Still, the HUD secretary retains the right of approval
 over any OFHEO actions that are not directly required by
 the legislation. OFHEO submits its appropriations requests
 and clears drafts of proposed regulations through the Of-
 fice of Management and Budget. The OFHEO director is
 appointed by the president, with Senate confirmation, to a
 five-year term. Fears that the safety and soundness regula-
 tors would dominate programmatic interests were allayed
 because the secretary retained direct authority over pro-
 grammatic oversight (see figure 3).
 Several senators and their staffs disliked the compro-
 mise. Expressing their sentiments, Senator Carl Levin (D-
 MI) commented that "the better course of action would
 have been to place the regulator of housing enterprises
 outside of HUD" (Cong. Rec. 1992, S8652). But the Sen-
 ate gave the House the structure it wanted in exchange for
 concessions in the areas of capital standards and afford-
 able-housing goals. Congressional staff note that Fannie
 Mae lobbied heavily with more sympathetic House mem-
 bers to maintain HUD's authority. The compromise, it was
 concluded, was the best available deal. "They could have
 been stronger," said Levin, "but at least the regulator does
 not report to the Secretary when it comes to safety and
 soundness" (Cong. Rec. 1992, S8652).
 As a final bit of protection, Fannie Mae fought to keep
 channels of congressional review in place as an insurance
 policy. Significant examples of this strategy include the
 requirements that OFHEO clear all proposed regulations
 through oversight committees and go through the yearly
 appropriations review (a requirement that bank regulators
 are not subject to). Critics of the final law note that be-
 cause the independent safety and soundness regulator was
 subject to the congressional appropriations process, the
 GSEs would have "a chance to exercise influence over the
 regulator by lobbying the Appropriations committees"
 (Taylor 1992). Administrative and congressional staff ex-
 plain that they understood why Fannie Mae wanted the
 appropriations clause inserted and that it could cause diffi-
 culties for OFHEO in the future. Nevertheless, the clause
 was accepted to get the bill passed.
 Although there is some substantive justification for the
 division of regulatory responsibility, this case study supports
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 Moe's glum conclusion that, given the objectives and influ-
 ence of interest groups, the democratic process is unlikely
 "to promote effective organization (T. Moe 1989, 329).
 Setting Capital Standards. The three congressionally
 mandated reports on the regulation of government-spon-
 sored enterprises recognized the need for meaningful capi-
 tal requirements to ensure the GSEs have enough money
 to cover losses. With each loan purchased, Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac assume credit risk (the borrower may not re-
 pay the loan) and interest rate risk (Fannie Mae or Freddie
 Mac may have to pay higher interest rates on debt than
 they receive from borrowers.) Although maintaining rea-
 sonable capital is prudent, holding excess capital is ineffi-
 cient; reserve capital does not maximize return. Thus, there
 is tension between the need for capital reserves and the
 desire to utilize capital profitably.
 The general approach suggested by the reports and
 agreed to by the administration and the GSEs was a two-
 part capital standard: a minimum capital standard, a
 baseline ratio of retained capital to liabilities, and a risk-
 based capital standard, a more complex requirement de-
 rived from projected losses under computer-simulated eco-
 nomic scenarios. The initial question was how much
 latitude Congress should grant OFHEO to translate the law
 into precise regulations.
 The GSEs disagreed on the desirability of regulatory
 discretion to specify the capital standards. Freddie Mac
 favored regulatory discretion, but Fannie Mae sought to
 have Congress define as much of the risk-based capital
 standard as possible to constrain any future regulatory
 agency. The Treasury Department wanted OFHEO to have
 complete discretion in setting capital standards.
 Fannie Mae invoked programmatic concerns in its ar-
 guments against discretion. A company spokesman sug-
 gested that a regulator with discretion could impose "such
 a high capital standard that the corporation would be un-
 able to fulfill its housing mission" (Zuckman 199 lb), an
 argument endorsed by corporate supporters (HDR 1992).
 The final legislation spelled out most of the minimum capi-
 tal requirement and a great deal of the risk-based capital
 requirement. Keeping the determination of capital stan-
 dards in the legislative domain was consistent with Fannie
 Mae's strategy throughout the legislative process: capital-
 ize on the good congressional relationships that had been
 cultivated and maintained over several years.
 Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac expressed differ-
 ent views on several specific questions, the two GSEs both
 argued against legislation that would raise capital levels.
 Once the capital standards battle was kept in Congress, the
 GSEs focused on shaping the regulations. Leland Brendsel,
 chairman and chief executive officer of Freddie Mac, and
 James Johnson, chairman and chief executive officer of
 Fannie Mae, both testified before Congress that overly de-
 manding capital standards would threaten the GSEs' ability
 to perform their programmatic functions (U.S. Senate 1991,
 197; U.S. House 199 lb, 36). By invoking the housing func-
 tions of their companies, as they did in arguing against regu-
 latory discretion, the two executives portrayed the capital
 standards debate as a conflict between programmatic goals
 and fiscal safety. This deflected attention from profitability.
 Other interest groups interested in profitability joined
 this chorus. Stephen Ashley, president of the Mortgage
 Bankers Association, warned that "excessive capital re-
 quirements are not necessary and, in fact, would limit credit
 availability and raise interest rates for homebuyers" (U.S.
 House 1991b, 72). Not coincidentally, that would mean a
 loss of business for the members of Ashley's organization.
 The California Association of Realtors argued that "Any
 increase in required capital for the FNMA and FHLMC
 will reduce the supply of lendable funds in the primary
 mortgage market and raise mortgage interest rates" and
 dismissed the prospects of a taxpayer bailout as "extremely
 remote" (U.S. Senate 1991, 380).
 More tellingly, interest groups clustered around the pro-
 grammatic node rallied against stringent safety and sound-
 ness regulations. In their testimony before Congress, af-
 fordable-housing advocates argued against higher capital
 standards. Paul Grogan, president of the Local Initiatives
 Support Corporation, a national nonprofit development
 organization, raised the danger that safety and soundness
 regulation would adversely affect affordable-housing pro-
 grams: "A regulator focusing only on safety and sound-
 ness will not take into account the impact of its actions on
 low-income housing and communities" (U.S. House 199 ]b,
 412). Such statements were not uncommon among afford-
 able-housing advocates (HDR 1991).
 The mobilization of interest groups suggests the conse-
 quences of the alignment of interests. In a conflict between
 profitability and safety and soundness, the programmatic
 node was a swing faction. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
 used their resources to recruit groups clustered around this
 node. The Treasury Department, the only institutional ad-
 vocate of safety and soundness, had no such ability.
 In advocating more stringent capital standards for the
 GSEs, Treasury representatives sought to distinguish the
 points of opposition. A central theme of Undersecretary
 Robert Glauber's testimony before Congress was that
 higher capital requirements do not necessitate reductions
 in affordable-housing support or increases in interest rates
 or fees charged to American home buyers. "It should be
 possible for these institutions to raise significant amounts
 of capital and do so without raising their prices," explained
 Glauber. "What it would mean would be somewhat of a
 reduction in the rate of return that they make (U.S. House
 1991b, 24)." Under questioning from Senator Jake Gain
 on the impact of increased capital requirements on mort-
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 gage interest rates, Glauber reiterated, "If anybody bore
 the burden, it would be the shareholders and not
 homebuyers" (U.S. House 1991b, 23).
 The problem with Glauber's claim lay in the struc-
 tural independence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
 Given the absence of direct governmental control over
 the two companies, there was no guarantee that increased
 capital standards would not adversely affect housing
 programs. While the companies could lower their rates
 of return, they could just as easily raise the fees charged
 to borrowers. Both the General Accounting Office and
 Congressional Budget Office recognized this possibil-
 ity and even calculated adjustments in rates paid by bor-
 rowers required to help GSEs meet higher capital re-
 quirements. A 1996 Congressional Budget Office report
 on the GSEs made the point more starkly, noting that
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac effectively decide how
 much of the federal subsidy that is implicit in the ad-
 vantages they receive is passed on to borrowers.
 Negotiations between Senate staff and representatives
 of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac resulted in the risk-based
 capital requirement (more stringent than the House ver-
 sion) that was included in the final bill. The conference
 committee adopted the Senate's capital standards and pa-
 rameters for a risk-based capital stress test. When the GSEs
 faced an unpalatable component of the capital standard in
 Congress, they argued for regulatory discretion, hoping to
 fight the battle another more advantageous day.'3 Suffice it
 to say, the compromise left ample room for dispute be-
 tween the new regulator and the GSEs.'4
 The legislative history of the capital standards confirms
 the influence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Not only
 were the GSEs able to employ their considerable political
 power, the organization of interests around government-
 sponsored enterprises allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
 to enlist groups with programmatic interests for their battle
 against stringent capital standards. Furthermore, the trian-
 gular arrangement of interests dictated the strategic behav-
 ior of the Treasury Department. In practice, this meant driv-
 ing a wedge between the programmatic and profitability
 nodes by arguing that the GSEs could cut profits to meet
 stricter capital requirements rather than paring affordable-
 housing programs. Given the resources at the GSEs' dis-
 posal, this strategy proved unworkable.
 Housing Goals. There is tension between the program-
 matic mission of the GSEs and both profitability and safety
 and soundness. Although the programmatic goals are pub-
 licly unassailable, there is resistance on the part of the GSEs
 to the additional burden of programmatic regulation. While
 fighting higher capital standards, programmatic goals were
 invoked by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and allies to dull
 the impact of safety and soundness regulations. In the case
 of affordable-housing goals, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
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 attempted to enlist groups clustered at the safety and sound-
 ness and profitability nodes to thwart the efforts of hous-
 ing proponents at the programmatic node.
 With Congress overhauling the regulation of Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac, interest groups that had been pressing
 the GSEs to contribute more to the development of low-
 income and affordable housing saw an opportunity. The
 affordable-housing aspect of the legislation was introduced
 when House Banking Committee chairman Henry
 Gonzalez inserted a provision requiring the GSEs to allot
 an amount equal to 20 percent of the previous year's divi-
 dend payments to the Federal Home Loan Banks "'Afford-
 able Housing Program," which subsidizes rental units for
 low-income families. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
 animated in their opposition to Gonzalez's subsidization
 provision (U.S. House 1991b). Their testimony on the sub-
 ject was vehement, they marshaled significant resistance
 from their allies, and the subsidization program was even-
 tually removed from the bill (with the blessing of many
 members of Congress who had argued the provision was a
 corruption of the GSEs' mission).
 The battle saw a parade of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
 allies rising to the GSEs' defense. The comments submitted
 by a host of Wall Street investment firms indicated that prof-
 itability was as significant in the resistance to the afford-
 able-housing goals as was safety and soundness. Jonathan
 Gray, for example, an analyst specializing in GSEs, asked
 members of the House subcommittee, "[H]ow would you
 feel, placing your money at risk, in a venture whose profits
 accrue to you only after a third party has extracted an inter-
 est, the amount of which interest is subject to change at any
 time?" (U.S. House 199 lb, 406). Many financial-sector par-
 ticipants that depend on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
 provide a large, lucrative share of their business urged mem-
 bers to recognize the importance of profitability, which, they
 suggested, was crucial to the success of government-spon-
 sored enterprises. Unlike Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
 which (as GSEs) risked offending the public with overt
 emphasis of profitability, these firms were politically safe to
 argue profitability and understood that it was in their busi-
 ness interest to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
 The backlash prompted Gonzalez to scrap his proposal
 and order the GSEs and housing groups to reach a com-
 promise, a move that proved controversial. In an episode
 recounted differently by all participants, representatives of
 the affordable-housing groups met with representatives of
 the GSEs and negotiated language that was inserted into
 the first House bill. The two paragraphs created a weak
 requirement "that a reasonable portion of the corporation's
 mortgage purchases be related to the national goal of pro-
 viding adequate housing for low- and moderate-income
 families, but with reasonable economic return to the cor-
 poration" (U.S. Congress 1991, 20, emphasis added).
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 Some observers, including Rep. James Leach (R-IA),
 cried foul and argued that Fannie Mae had bought off the
 affordable-housing groups with donations from its Fannie
 Mae Foundation. Housing groups that were dependent on
 the money, it was alleged, were forced to choose between
 supporting Fannie Mae and sacrificing funds (Zuckman
 1991 a).'5 According to a former committee staffer, mem-
 bers of the committee chose not to fight for tougher regu-
 lations when the affordable-housing groups signed off.
 The situation was different on the Senate side. A bipar-
 tisan group of senators of varying ideological backgrounds
 called for greater dedication to programmatic goals. Chair-
 man Donald Riegle (D-MI) and ranking minority member
 Jake Garn (R-OH) both supported more ambitious afford-
 able-housing goals. Riegle introduced the Senate bill on
 the floor, noting that "[HUD regulations] have been too
 weak and often have not been enforced. So the bill creates
 better standards with specific enforcement tools that will
 require the GSE's to increase their efforts to provide fi-
 nancing for those who need it most" (Cong. Rec. 1992,
 S8607). Others, such as Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL), were
 more strident: "Congress must send a strong message to
 the GSE's that they have important public purposes which
 must be fulfilled. Their responsibilities are not just to their
 shareholders who have benefited handsomely from the
 GSE's unique relationship to the Federal Government.
 Their responsibilities are also to the public: To maintain
 their financial safety, but also to assure that our housing
 finance markets work for the benefit of all Americans-
 not just the affluent" (Cong. Rec. 1992, S8651). The af-
 fordable-housing provisions of the bill were solidified and
 specified, effectively adding enforcement provisions and
 force of law to existing HUD housing goals.
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were reluctant to express
 opposition to housing goals in principle and, in fact, en-
 dorsed the Senate legislation after extensive negotiation.
 Groups sympathetic to the GSEs resisted the housing goals,
 testifying they were unnecessary and potentially damag-
 ing to the enterprises. '6 For example, Fannie Mae, Freddie
 Mac, the National Association of Realtors, the Mortgage
 Bankers Association, and the National Association of Home
 Builders visited members en masse and warned against
 the dangers of stretching the GSEs. Overly ambitious hous-
 ing goals, they claimed, could jeopardize their safety and
 soundness and cost taxpayers billions.
 On this issue, the advocates of safety and soundness were
 in the swing position. Initially, the Treasury resisted the goals,
 fearing they might pose a threat to safety and soundness,
 though this position was never taken publicly. Treasury of-
 ficials recognized that without the support of housing inter-
 ests that demanded the affordable-housing goals and, more
 importantly, the Senators who agreed with them, the bill
 would never pass and safety and soundness would die with
 it. Although the Treasury Department's reports on GSE regu-
 lation and testimony before Congress made it clear that safety
 should be the paramount regulatory concern, the housing
 goals could be approved with confidence that safety and
 soundness would not be jeopardized.
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac argued the programmatic
 goals were poorly defined and difficult to meet, yet they
 could not attack them on principle. Thus, the only mecha-
 nism available was to enlist the third node: safety and
 soundness. The Treasury's unwillingness to endorse the
 argument that safety and soundness would be threatened
 by the affordable-housing goals diluted the strength of this
 approach. The GSEs argued they were already working to
 expand lending to low- and moderate-income families, but
 without the support of the safety and soundness node the
 GSEs could not eliminate the goals.
 The inclusion of affordable housing goals was not an
 overwhelming defeat of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The
 deletion of the rent-subsidization program demonstrated
 that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could influence the craft-
 ing of the goals and avoid their most disliked designs when
 alliances among interests were not formed. The GSEs'
 political muscle was used effectively to mobilize sympa-
 thetic interest groups in the housing and financial sectors.
 As the testimony on the Affordable Housing Program sub-
 sidy indicates, a range of groups lobbied against the re-
 quirement. Most importantly, the Treasury's antipathy to-
 ward this provision was never in doubt. It was dropped
 from the conference version of the bill.
 Furthermore, critics point out that the goals did not force
 the GSEs to finance significantly higher levels of afford-
 able housing than Fannie Mae was funding at the time of
 the bill's passage. Also the enforcement mechanisms are
 extremely weak. HUD can do little more than admonish
 the GSEs if they do not meet goals. Finally, HUD may be
 reluctant to damage the productive working relationships
 it has established with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
 Epilogue. It is still too early to pass judgment on the
 efficacy of the new regulatory regime. OFHEO has final-
 ized and applied the minimum capital standards (both
 companies have complied) and recently published its pro-
 posed risk-based capital regulation, beginning what is sure
 to be a contentious period of negotiation and gamesman-
 ship with the GSEs, Congress, and the administration
 (Connor 1999; OFHEO 1997). Under the proposed rule
 Freddie Mac would meet the capital standards, while
 Fannie Mae would not.
 The housing goals passed by Congress had a three-part
 requirement with interim goals in low-income, central cit-
 ies, and special affordable categories. Although there has
 been some controversy regarding HUD's interpretation of
 the law, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac met most of
 the interim targets (failing in the central cities category).
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 HUD just recently proposed its final regulation, which
 would raise the target for loans to low- and moderate-in-
 come families from 42 percent to 50 percent by the end of
 the year 2001 (Day 1999). Fannie Mae, but not Freddie
 Mac, has expressed its acceptance of the new goals.
 Arguments against the new capital rules and housing
 goals have conformed to the patterns described in this ar-
 ticle. In both cases, the third node-programmatic con-
 cerns in the first case, financial safety in the second-has
 been invoked to tilt the scales toward profitability.
 Implications
 From the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, implica-
 tions can be inferred regarding the ramifications of organi-
 zational structure for GSEs and other hybrid institutions.
 Organizational Structure as a Feedback Loop
 As Terry Moe contends, interest group influence in the
 legislative process partially explains the creation of a regu-
 latory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that
 is saddled with contradictions and ambiguities. In each
 component of the Federal Housing Enterprise Safety and
 Soundness Act of 1992, the GSEs were able to dilute or
 obfuscate the objectives. However, this account glosses over
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's ability to shape and ma-
 nipulate interest group preferences. This suggests the need
 for refinement of Moe's argument.
 The previous section illustrated that the triangular arrange-
 ment of interests rewarded actors who maintained alliances
 between interest group nodes. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
 were able, in the view of first-hand observers, to design their
 regulation. They did so with the assistance of allies, many
 of whom had little self-interest in helping the GSEs. Mod-
 els of interest group participation in institution building
 should account for organizations with the ability to manipu-
 late preferences of other groups for their own self-interest.
 In this case, the politics of structure could be represented
 as a feedback loop. By exerting influence on the crafting of
 the 1992 legislation, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac effec-
 tively influenced their own regulatory structure. This, in turn,
 guaranteed their influence in the future. The limits of this
 loop are unclear. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for example,
 have agitated for congressional charter amendments to
 broaden the scope of potential activities, engendering seri-
 ous opposition from formidable opponents including the
 organization of FM Watch as a political counterweight.
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will likely counter any efforts
 by FM Watch to diminish their influence in aggressive fash-
 ion. Thus a new test of the GSEs' influence may come soon.
 With a single case, it is difficult to specify when such
 "feedback loops" might arise. Certainly, some government
 agencies influence the political actors that ostensibly are
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 overseeing them. However, the structure of government-
 sponsored enterprises is a key factor in explaining the dis-
 tinguishing influence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It
 endows the GSE with resources for political influence and
 results in an arrangement of interest groups that allows
 and rewards strategic manipulation. Although greater speci-
 fication is required, the point is noteworthy. Like genetic
 mutations, some hybrid organizations may continue to
 change-sometimes in ways that are neither foreseen nor
 desired by their creators.
 Hybrid Institutions: Out of Control or
 Self-Control?
 Lloyd Musolf and Harold Seidman (1980) warn that
 government-sponsored enterprises are governmental insti-
 tutions beyond the control of government. This proposi-
 tion offends the ideals of popular sovereignty and govern-
 ment accountability. While it does not appear that any
 governmental entity "controls" Fannie Mae and Freddie
 Mac, this study suggests a more complicated truth: The
 infrastructure to "control" them may exist, but GSEs have
 the resources, ability, and position to control their own
 controllers. "7
 This conclusion is offered while sidestepping the siz-
 able literature devoted to the problematic concept of con-
 trol. That is possible because the point is straightforward.
 If government-sponsored enterprises can, by nature, exert
 great influence over those responsible for controlling them,
 it is difficult to imagine a definition of control that would
 be satisfied.
 Concrete conclusions are inappropriate. Not only is it
 too early to judge the success or failure of the Federal
 Housing Enterprise Safety and Soundness Act of 1992,
 alternative proposals for regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie
 Mac might provide more stringent oversight. For example,
 a proposed super-regulator for all government-sponsored
 enterprises might be more independent and less prone to
 capture than a single-purpose, quasi-independent office of
 HUD. Still, this case should serve as a warning to those
 seeking to employ a hybrid organization. Designers of fu-
 ture hybrids must be aware of the political potential of the
 organizations they are creating. Few would have antici-
 pated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would grow into
 political heavyweights.
 Government-sponsored enterprises are an intriguing al-
 ternative form of government. Their ability to address pub-
 lic needs at no direct expense to the taxpayer makes them
 appealing, particularly when paring the cost of government
 is a concern. This article introduces some nonbudgetary rami-
 fications of this approach. As proposals for additional GSEs
 are considered, it would be wise to consider the consequences
 of creating independent political actors with potential influ-
 ence greater than most institutions, public or private.
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 Notes
 1. Interviews were conducted in the spring of 1996 and the sum-
 mer of 1997. Interview subjects included representatives of
 organizations that participated in the development of the leg-
 islation, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Treasury
 Department, the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
 opment, the Office of Management and Budget, nonprofit
 and industry interest groups, and committee staff from the
 relevant committees and subcommittees on both the House
 and Senate sides of Congress. Interviews were conducted on
 background and subjects declined to be cited by name.
 2. Home loans are frequently financed with the assistance of
 Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or institutions that rely upon the
 Federal Home Loan Bank System. Farm purchases are often
 financed through Farm Credit Banks, Banks for Cooperatives,
 or the Federal Agriculture Mortgage Corporation (Farmer
 Mac). Student loans are frequently purchased by the Student
 Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), recently "priva-
 tized," and college facilities construction can be financed with
 the assistance of the College Construction Loan Corporation
 (Connie Lee). Securities issued by these GSEs are present in
 the portfolios of most investment funds and savings institu-
 tions. In addition to these federal institutions, there are nu-
 merous similarly structured state and local entities involved
 in housing, transportation, environmental protection, utility
 provision, and other public functions.
 3. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities are also considered
 governmental with respect to restrictions on investment of
 public funds.
 4. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was created in 1932
 to lend money at 3 percent interest in an effort to revive the
 economy. Congress appropriated $300 million to the agency.
 It also issued debt and bonds to raise money (Fish 1979, 195).
 5. In this article, loans described as FHA-insured also include
 loans insured by the Department of Veterans Affairs.
 6. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sometimes purchase their own
 securities and retain them in their own portfolios.
 7. Not all home loans are eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae
 and Freddie Mac. There is a ceiling on the dollar value of
 loans they can purchase, plus standards which all loans must
 meet for purchase. Loans that meet these requirements are
 called conforming loans. There is a significant secondary
 market for nonconforming loans, that is loans that cannot be
 purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
 8. Section 1004 of FIRREA, the 1989 law that overhauled regu-
 lation of the savings and loan industry, required the comp-
 troller general of the United States to prepare a study of gov-
 ernment-sponsored enterprises, including Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac, to determine the financial soundness and sta-
 bility of the government-sponsored enterprises; the need to
 minimize any potential financial exposure of the federal gov-
 ernment; and the need to minimize any potential impact on
 borrowing of the federal government.
 9. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 required
 the Treasury Department and the Congressional Budget
 Office to prepare additional reports on GSE regulation and
 required congressional consideration of GSE legislation by
 September 1991. Failure to consider legislation would re-
 sult in a mandatory vote on a proposal to be presented by
 the Treasury Department.
 10. HUD's limited regulatory authority over Fannie Mae and
 Freddie Mac had rarely been utilized due to chronic lack of
 resources, expertise, and political leverage. In 1989, the
 FIRREA legislation added oversight of Freddie Mac to
 HUD's responsibilities and required the issuance of new
 regulations for the GSEs. By the time that regulation of
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was being restructured, no
 final regulations had been issued.
 11. While using the term repeatedly, this paper does not take on
 the vexing issues of "power" described by March (1966),
 Dahl (1957), and others. A simplistic definition-the abil-
 ity to get what one wants-is utilized for the analysis of this
 case. Further specification is clearly required.
 12. The disagreement revealed differences between the two com-
 panies. At the time the FHEFSSA was under consideration,
 Freddie Mac had been a private company for only two years.
 Prior to the introduction of stock ownership and creation of
 a board of directors, Freddie Mac, in the words of an ad-
 ministration official, functioned "like an agency not a pri-
 vate corporation." The leadership at Freddie Mac did not
 have the political experience or perspicacity that Fannie Mae
 strategists displayed. The contrast between Leland Brendsel,
 Freddie Mac's CEO, and Jim Johnson, Fannie Mae's leader,
 is telling. Brendsel is a Ph.D. economist. Johnson was a top
 aide to Vice President Mondale and a successful Wall Street
 investment banker.
 With the transformation from government agency to private
 corporation, Freddie Mac moved to the profitability node
 of the triangle-but had not yet adapted. As a congressional
 aide put it, "Freddie Mac was operating under an organiza-
 tional culture reflecting past interests." Fannie Mae, on the
 other hand, recognized the virtue of keeping authority within
 HUD, a government agency that, like many interest groups
 called upon to support the GSEs' positions, relied on part-
 nerships with Fannie Mae.
 13. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had strategic reasons to press
 for ambiguous language in the FHEFSSA. For example, one
 version of the risk-based capital rules required the regulator
 to identify the worst historical interest rate shocks for use in
 the stress test. The GSEs resisted this clear requirement and
 insisted that the final bill require only that the interest rate
 portion of the stress test be "reasonably related" to the worst
 historical experience. This left the door open for future dis-
 pute (and negotiation) with OFHEO. The frequent appear-
 ances of the phrase "reasonably related" suggests the ap-
 peal of this solution for the GSEs. Fannie Mae was able to
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 extract such concessions because the Bush administration
 and several senators were eager to pass the law and feared
 the ability of the GSEs to, at the very least, delay its pas-
 sage. By creating mechanisms to exert pressure on their regu-
 lators through Congress, the GSEs maintained the value of
 their good relations on Capitol Hill.
 14. The unanswered questions of the capital standards affect
 millions of dollars for each GSE. Even seemingly simple
 issues can be vexing. For example, the risk-based capital
 standard required by Congress calls for a stress test. A com-
 puter simulation is utilized to determine how much capital
 the GSEs require to withstand a horrendous economic sce-
 nario as bad as the worst 10-year period experienced in any
 region of the United States. This simplified clause gives some
 sense of the difficulty of the task. What is a region? The
 legislation says only that a region is 10 contiguous states.
 Which 10 states? This question is critically important; it
 defines how bad the worst-case scenario is for the GSEs.
 Development of the capital standards requires the regulator
 to resolve scores of such difficult questions.
 15. In his dissenting views on H.R. 2900, reported out of the
 House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
 Rep. Jim Leach expressed his dismay over this phenom-
 enon: "The committee's judgment on the housing provisions
 of the bill unfortunately was clouded by the endorsement of
 the approach favored by Fannie and Freddie by a variety of
 activist consumer groups which without notification to Con-
 gress became recipients of substantial contributions from
 the two GSEs" (U.S. House 1991 a, 1 2).
 16. As one Treasury staffer who worked on the legislation re-
 called, "Fannie would make a phone call and all of a sudden
 fifty letters would arrive on the Hill. And the letters all pretty
 much looked the same because Fannie would draft it and
 send it out."
 17. In a remarkable letter to their colleagues, Representatives
 J.J. Pickle and Willis Gradison, who had begun the drive
 toward FHEFSSA by inserting the report requirement into
 the savings and loan bill, urged that Fannie Mae's influence
 be resisted: "We believe that Fannie Mae should not pos-
 sess a veto over the form of its own supervision. The pri-
 mary concern of Congress in drafting this legislation should
 be to protect the taxpayer by requiring all GSEs to be capi-
 talized adequately. Public policy on such a serious issue
 should not be stalled, perhaps permanently, by lobbying ef-
 forts that put the private interest of a single enterprise above
 the broader public interest" (Pickle and Gradison 1992).
 They concluded emphatically that "The time has come to
 protect the public purse not Fannie Mae's profits" (Pickle
 and Gradison 1992).
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 Figure 1 How Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Work
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